Introduction
Nuclear weapons are potentially the most destructive weapons ever invented. h e almost unimaginable impact of the use of nuclear weapons, including on the environment, was recognised by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons 1 (hereat er, Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion). As the ICJ recognised, their characteristics render nuclear weapons: potentially catastrophic. h e destructive power of nuclear weapons cannot be contained in either space or time. h ey have the potential to destroy all civilization and the entire ecosystem of the planet. h e radiation release by a nuclear explosion would af ect health, agriculture, natural resources and demography over a very wide area. Further, the use of nuclear weapons would be a serious danger to future generations. Ionizing radiation has the potential to damage the future environment, food and marine ecosystem, and to cause genetic defects and illness in future generations. 2 In the case of a use of nuclear weapons, however, the Court's discussion of the relevant rules of public international law governing the protection of the environment is rather general. h e Court stated in this regard:
States must take environmental considerations into account when assessing what is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military objectives. Respect for the environment is one of the elements that go to assessing whether an action is in conformity with the principles of necessity and proportionality … h e Court thus i nds that while the existing international law relating to the protection and safeguarding of the environment does not specii cally prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, it indicates important environmental factors that are properly to be taken into account in the context of the implementation of the principles and rules of the law applicable in armed conl ict. 3 In view of the environmental consequences of the use of any nuclear weapon, the general concern for the environment during armed conl ict since 1972, 4 and the development of specii c rules of public international law in this area, the ICJ's analysis might appear rather unambitious. Further, it is surprising that the Court chose to discuss rules protecting the environment during armed conl ict separately from its assessment of the legality of the use of nuclear weapons under 'the law applicable in armed conl ict, in particular humanitarian law' (para. 36).
In view of recent developments relating to the possession and use of nuclear weapons 5 and renewed interest in the law governing the protection of the environment in relation to armed conl ict, 6 further clarii cation of the applicable law is warranted. h is chapter seeks to clarify the scope of the relevant rules of the law of armed conl ict and to assess, in abstracto , the legality of use of nuclear weapons under these rules. 7 gov/the-press-oi ce/2013/06/19/fact-sheet-nuclear-weapons-employment-strategyunited-states . 6 In 2011 the International Law Commission (ILC) decided to include the protection of the environment in relation to armed conl icts in its long-term programme of work. UN doc. A/66/10, Report of the International Law Commission, Sixty-third session (26 April-3 June and 4 July-12 August 2011), para. 365. See ILC, 'Protection of the environment in relation to armed conl icts' , last updated 5 June 2013, http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/8_7.htm. 7 Protection of the environment during armed conl ict also follows from jus ad bellum and jus pacis . h e protection of the environment during armed conl ict under jus ad bellum follows from the establishment by the Security Council in 1991 of Iraq's responsibility for all environmental damage resulting from its illegal use of force against Kuwait (Resolution relating to the protection of the environment during international armed conl ict (Section A). It then discusses protection of the environment during armed conl ict under customary international law (Section B). h e chapter ends with a brief conclusion.
A. Protection of the environment under treaty law
h e protection of the environment under the law of armed conl ict is specii cally regulated in four treaties: 8 It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.
Article 55 provides that:
1. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage. h is protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population. intrinsic value of the environment, arguably Article 55 aims to protect the environment as a civilian object (Article 55 is included in Chapter III of Part IV which deals with the protection of the civilian population, including civilian objects), in particular because of its importance for the health and survival of the civilian population. h e former provision is therefore generally regarded as ecocentric while the latter is considered anthropocentric. 19 Although states drat ing 1977 Additional Protocol I were concerned for the environment in times of international armed conl ict, particularly at er witnessing the damage resulting from the war in Vietnam, they did not mean to prohibit ordinary battlei eld damage. Indeed, during the Diplomatic Conference, the United Kingdom observed in relation to Article 55 that the provision struck the necessary balance, protecting the environment against severe damage 'while not making for instance, a tank commander whose tank l attened a clump of trees liable as a war criminal' . 20 Further, a conference report stated that: h e time or duration required … was considered by some to be measured in decades. References to twenty or thirty years were made by some representatives as being a minimum. Others referred to battlei eld destruction in France in the First World War as being outside the scope of the prohibition. h e report also observed that:
it is impossible to say with certainty what period of time might be involved. It appeared to be a widely shared assumption that battlei eld damage incidental to conventional warfare would not normally be proscribed by this provision. 21 For those reasons, it was agreed that only under exceptional circumstances would damage to the environment lead to a violation of the law of armed conl ict. First, Articles 35(3) and 55 of 1977 Additional Protocol I only prohibit use of means and methods that are either intended or expected to cause damage to the environment. Accordingly, each provision prohibits not only deliberate or direct attacks on the environment, but also attacks where it is reasonably forseeable that they will lead to excessive collateral environmental damage. 22 h is applies irrespective of the weapons used and requires those who deploy these means or methods of warfare to know or reasonably predict that the attack they will launch will have such detrimental ef ects. h is is an important limiting factor since environmental harm is not always directly visible or demonstrable. Natural processes are dii cult to analyse and military commanders may not know how certain activities will impact the environment over the long term. 23 Second, it was agreed that the use of means and methods of warfare would only be prohibited if such means or methods of warfare would lead to 'widespread, long-term and severe' damage to the environment. Indeed, contrary to the drat ers of the 1976 ENMOD Convention, the drat ers of Articles 35(3) and 55 chose to include a cumulative damage threshold: widespread, longterm and severe. 24 Since these terms were not dei ned, they must be interpreted in accordance with the general rules of treaty interpretation as rel ected in Articles 31 and 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). 25 Potentially, however, establishing the ordinary meaning of the terms widespread, long-term and severe 26 is a highly subjective exercise. 27 It continues to be the understanding of the United Kingdom that the rules introduced by the Protocol apply exclusively to conventional weapons without prejudice to any other rules of international law applicable to other types of weapons. In particular, the rules so introduced do not have any ef ect on and do not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. 36 h ese declarations could be taken to amount to reservations according to Article 2(1)(d) VCLT. Apart from the view that both reservations are based on a misunderstanding of the scope of the Protocol, as was explained above, arguably both reservations are incompatible with the object and purpose of 1977 Additional Protocol I. 37 h e object and purpose of a treaty must be established by discovering the 'essence' of a treaty, which can be derived from the title of a treaty, its preamble, a particular article, preparatory works or its general architecture. 38 h e essence of the law of armed conl ict, including 1977 Additional Protocol I, is the alleviation of the calamities of war in general, 39 and the protection of the victims of armed conl ict in particular. 40 It is clearly contrary to 35 'Referring to the drat protocol prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross, which was the basis of the work of the 1974-7 Diplomatic Conference, the Government of France continues to consider that the provisions of the Protocol concern exclusively conventional weapons, and that they can neither regulate nor prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, nor prejudice other rules of international law applicable to other actions necessary for France's exercise of its inherent right of self defence. ' Unoi cial translation. 36 Available at: www.icrc.org/ihl . 37 the aforementioned objects to exclude the use of the most destructive weapon ever invented from the scope of the (new) provisions of the Protocol, including its provisions on the protection of the (human) environment. As the Court recognised:
h ese characteristics render the nuclear weapon potentially catastrophic. h e destructive power of nuclear weapons cannot be contained in either space or time. h ey have the potential to destroy all civilization and the entire ecosystem of the planet. h e radiation released by a nuclear explosion would af ect health, agriculture, natural resources and demography over a very wide area. Further, the use of nuclear weapons would be a serious danger to future generations. Ionizing radiation has the potential to damage the future environment, food and marine ecosystem, and to cause genetic defects and illness in future generations. 41 Assuming, however, that Articles 35(3) and 55 of the Protocol would indeed apply to a new use of nuclear weapons, it is likely that such use would breach both provisions. Although damage resulting from a nuclear explosion will depend on a number of factors, such as the type of explosion (sub-surface burst, surface burst or air burst), the type of nuclear weapon involved (i ssion/fusion weapon, enhanced radiation weapon), the environment where the explosion takes place and the weather at the time of, and at er, the explosion, it is nonetheless likely that any nuclear explosion during an armed conl ict would cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment, and that such damage would be reasonably foreseeable. 42 Both blast and heat will cause signii cant damage on the ground in case of an air burst, a surface burst or a shallow underground burst, and radioactive contamination resulting from the explosion could cover large areas and last for a signii cant period of time. Local fallout generally comes down within 24 hours at er the explosion in a cigar-shaped pattern, downwind from 'Ground Zero' , and is most damaging, since it contains between 40 per cent and 70 per cent of the total radioactivity, and may be of such intensity that certain areas will be severely af ected and even remain uni t for human habitation for decades. 43 41 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, para. 35. 42 Some authors assert that the drat ers of Arts. 35(3) and 55 did indeed consider non-conventional means and methods of warfare, such as herbicides and chemical weapons, when they elaborated the two provisions. See 
Rule 44 states:
Methods and means of warfare must be employed with due regard to the protection and preservation of the natural environment. In the conduct of military operations, all feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimise, incidental damage to the environment. Lack of scientii c certainty as to the ef ects on the environment of certain military operations does not absolve a party to the conl ict from taking such precautions.
Rule 45 states:
h e use of methods or means or warfare that are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment is prohibited. Destruction of the natural environment may not be used as a weapon.
assumption that the local population would almost entirely consume locally produced food, and since substantial amounts of radioactive elements had entered the food chain around Bikini Atoll, this would lead to an annual dose that was considered too high by IAEA safety standards. P. Stegnar , ' Review at Bikini Atoll: assessing radiological conditions at Bikini Atoll and the prospects for resettlement ' , IAEA Bulletin 40 ( 4 ) ( 1998 Since it is unlikely that nuclear weapons would ever be used without (imperative) military necessity and highly unlikely that they would be used for the sole purpose of causing damage to the natural environment, this section only discusses the meaning and scope of Rules 43C and 44. h e i rst sentence of Rule 45 generally rel ects Articles 35(3) and 55, and indicates that, in the view of the ICRC, both provisions have developed into rules of customary international law, with the United States as a persistent objector to the i rst sentence of the customary rule in general, and France, the UK and the United States as persistent objectors to the application of the i rst sentence of the rule to the use of nuclear weapons. 45 As the scope of the prohibition to use methods and means of warfare expected to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment was discussed above, Rule 45 will not be further discussed here.
Rule 43C: the prohibition on excessive collateral damage to the environment
h e prohibition on launching an attack against a military objective that may be expected to cause incidental damage to the environment that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated (or, in short: the prohibition on excessive collateral damage to the environment) is a relatively new manifestation of the principle of proportionality. h e principle of proportionality is a fundamental principle of the law of armed conl ict -despite not being referred to by the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion -and a 'general principle on the conduct of hostilities' (chapeau Rule 43). h e prohibition on excessive collateral damage to the environment appears to complement the Treaty and customary prohibitions on excessive collateral damage to civilians and civilian objects as laid down in Article 51(4) and (5) h e customary prohibition on excessive collateral damage to the environment arguably emerged during the 1990s, triggered by damage to the environment caused by Iraq during the 1990-91 Gulf War. 46 Arguably the familiarity of states, and in particular their (military) legal advisers, with customary and conventional rules governing the protection of civilian objects under IHL, in combination with a growing concern for the environment, in particular at er 1991, triggered the emergence of a specii c customary prohibition on excessive collateral damage to the environment. h e existence of the customary prohibition is generally accepted in practice, 47 as is evident from a variety of sources, including treaties and other instruments, national practice, practice of international organisations and conferences, practice of international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, and the practice of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. 48 environmental damage which would be excessive in relation to the direct military advantage which the attack is expected to produce' . 52 As noted above, in its Advisory Opinion the ICJ ai rmed that: 'States must take environmental considerations into account when assessing what is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military objectives. ' 53 Additionally, the rule appears to be evidenced (without reference to the 'triple damage standard') by its rel ection in military manuals, such as the US Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, 54 as well as by a number of public statements by states within the framework of international organisations. Canada, for example, declared in 1992 to the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly:
An important evolution was thus taking place which rel ected the importance of the ecological point of view and which should be brought to bear on other questions, such as that of proportionality (the need to strike a balance between the protection of the environment and the needs of war) or that of the distinction between military and non-military objectives. Under the same principle, the environment as such should not be the object of direct attack, and this delegation would like to see that point rel ected in the resolution to be adopted at er discussion of the item. 55 Finally, emergence of a customary international law prohibition on excessive collateral damage to the environment appears implicit in Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the ICC Statute, which qualii es as a war crime:
Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.
Article 8(2)(b)(iv), which rel ects Article 51(4) and (5)(b) of 1977 Additional Protocol I, is clearly inspired by Articles 35(3) and 55 of the Protocol. It appears to correlate the protection of civilian objects with protection of the environment as laid down in the Protocol. 56 Although Article 8(2)(b)(iv) provides for individual criminal responsibility for intentionally launching an attack which causes excessive collateral damage to the environment, and which must also be widespread, long-term and severe, arguably the provision implies the existence of an independent and 'primary' rule of the law of armed conl ict from which the war crime is derived. As such, this primary rule -as expressed in Rule 43C -partly underlies Article 8(2)(b)(iv).
For states parties to 1977 Additional Protocol I, this customary prohibition on excessive collateral damage to the environment complements Articles 35(3) and 55 of the Protocol. 57 In addition to an absolute prohibition to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment, states parties to the Protocol are also prohibited from causing excessive collateral damage to the environment during armed conl ict. Since the two obligations are of dif erent scope, it must be established which prevails, or rather which must be applied i rst. It is submitted that any military action that causes damage to the environment must i rst be assessed against this customary prohibition and only then, if no breach is established, against Articles 35(3) and 55 of the Protocol. h e customary prohibition emerged later in time and provides relative protection to the environment (contrary to absolute protection of the environment under Articles 35(3) and 55). As such, it appears that the protection af orded by the law is signii cantly enhanced by the emergence of a customary prohibition on causing excessive collateral damage to the environment. h e relevance of the prohibition in the case of use of a nuclear weapon will depend on the circumstances of the case. As above, the damage resulting from nuclear explosions will generally be signii cant and foreseeably so. However, the extent to which any damage to the environment qualii es as 'excessive' will depend on the actual military advantage anticipated, as is apparent from the text of Rule 43C. If a military object qualii es as a highly valuable military target, then its destruction may justify considerable collateral damage. In contrast, 57 h e customary prohibition on excessive collateral damage to the environment must be distinguished from the prohibition on excessive collateral damage to civilian objects as provided under Art. 51(4) and (5) if a military object is not very valuable for military purposes and is not very important for the war ef ort, its destruction would not seem to justify considerable collateral damage. h e prohibition on excessive collateral damage always entails a balancing of factors, and application of this test therefore depends on the circumstances of the case.
2. Rule 44: the customary duty of care for the environment during armed conl ict A customary obligation to employ means and methods of warfare with due regard to the protection and preservation of the environment (Rule 44, i rst sentence) 58 appears to imply the existence of a general duty of care for the environment during armed conl ict. 59 A t er all, 'due regard' is merely a standard to be applied, similar to the obligation to show 'due diligence' , which must be applied to prevent transboundary environmental harm, 60 and which appears to be related to the general obligation on each state 'not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states' . 61 h is obligation, also known under the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas , is arguably based on a general duty of care similar to the one binding private individuals and legal persons, as recognised in the civil law of tort. 62 According to the ICRC, Rule 44 follows from 'recognition of the need to provide particular protection to the environment as such' . 63 Rule 44 therefore qualii es as ecocentric, similar to Article 35(3) of 1977 Additional Protocol I. It rel ects general concern for the environment during armed conl ict dating back to 1972, as discussed above, and that is expressed most explicitly in UN General Assembly Resolution 47/37 of 25 November 1992 64 and the General Assembly's decision to declare 6 November the 'International Day for Preventing the Exploitation of the Environment in War and Armed Conl ict' . 65 h e emergence of a duty of care for the environment during armed conl ict was identii ed by the ICRC from a variety of sources, which include treaties and other international instruments and state practice, notably as set out in military manuals and in statements within international organisations and conferences. 66 For example, several military manuals provide that military operations must be carried out with due regard to the protection of the environment, such as the US Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations. 67 Further, a number of states have ai rmed (or at least implied) the existence of a duty of care for the environment during armed conl ict. In 1991, for example, Canada issued a memorandum that implied the existence of such a duty of care; 68 and in 1995 and 1996 a number of states expressed concern for the environment during armed conl ict and a need to show due regard before the ICJ within the framework of the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion. 69 Although the Court did not acknowledge the existence of a duty of care for the environment during armed conl ict as such, it did observe that environmental factors and considerations must play an important role in the implementation of the law of armed conl ict, 70 which suggests the existence of an obligation to show due regard for the environment during armed conl ict. Finally, a duty of care for the environment is arguably evidenced by the i rst sentence of Article 55(1) of 1977 Additional Protocol I, which provides: 'Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage. ' 71 A duty of care for the environment or an obligation to use methods and means of warfare with due regard for the environment during armed conl ict entails that states must take 'all feasible precautions' in the conduct of military operations 'to avoid, and in any event to minimise, incidental damage to the environment' 72 (Rule 44, second sentence). 73 h e second sentence of Rule 44 'operationalises' the more general obligation in the i rst sentence and appears to rel ect the general principle of prevention, which qualii es as a principle of international environmental law. 74 h e requirement to take all feasible in Armed Conl ict , 8 July 1996 (hereat er, WHO Advisory Opinion Request), p. 3. Iran, Sweden and New Zealand each expressed a concern for the environment during armed conl ict. precautions 'objectii es' the behaviour of belligerents and requires that belligerents act reasonably or in conformity with what could be reasonably expected from that state under the specii c circumstances. As such, an assessment must be made of all environmental risks. 75 While the obligation to take all feasible precautions to avoid or minimise damage to the environment appears to require foreseeability of environmental damage, Rule 44 further states that '[l]ack of scientii c certainty as to the ef ects on the environment of certain military operations does not absolve a party to the conl ict from taking such precautions' . As such, the third sentence of Rule 44 goes further than the other rules of the law of armed conl ict that protect the environment and that were discussed above. It rel ects the precautionary principle, 76 which arguably qualii es as a principle of international environmental law, 77 and which is essential in view of the dii culty of analysing natural processes and assessing environmental damage.
Similar to the prohibition on excessive collateral damage to the environment, this customary duty of care for the environment complements Articles 35(3) and 55 of 1977 Additional Protocol I. For states parties to the Protocol, and for the same reasons as mentioned above in relation to the prohibition on excessive collateral damage to the environment, any military operation or use Hazardous Activities, with commentaries, 2001). h e Articles on Transboundary Pollution provide, in short, that the state of origin must take all appropriate measures to prevent signii cant transboundary harm or minimise the risk thereof. For that purpose, states must under certain circumstances carry out a proper environmental impact assessment. 75 Compare Rule 18, which requires states to 'do everything feasible to assess whether the attack may be expected to cause' excessive collateral damage to the civilian population or civilian objects. 76 See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law , Vol. I, Rule 44, p. 150. 77 See Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, which refers to a precautionary approach in case of scientii c uncertainty. h e formulation of Rule 44's second and third sentence indicates that the precautionary approach is part of the obligation to take all feasible precautions to avoid or at least minimise incidental environmental damage. A similar approach was taken by the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in its Advisory Opinion on Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area of 1 February 2011. h e Chamber held that 'it is appropriate to point out that the precautionary approach is also an integral part of the general obligation of due diligence of sponsoring States, which is applicable even outside the scope of the Regulations. h e due diligence obligation of the sponsoring States requires them to take all appropriate measures to prevent damage that might result from the activities of contractors that they sponsor. h is obligation applies in situations where scientii c evidence concerning the scope and potential negative impact of the activity in question is insui cient but where there are plausible indications of potential risks. A sponsoring State would not meet its obligation of due diligence if it disregarded those risks. Such disregard would amount to a failure to comply with the precautionary approach' (para. 131). See also Separate Opinion of Judge Can ç ado Trindade, Pulp Mills case, paras. 52-3, 62-92. severe damage to the environment and will therefore be contrary to Articles 35(3) and 55, to the extent that these provisions are applicable. h is author has also argued that under customary international law, Rules 43C of the ICRC's CIHL Study (the prohibition on causing excessive collateral damage to the environment) and 44 (the general duty of care for the environment during armed conl ict) must also be taken into account by all nuclear weapon states. Since both rules provide relative protection to the environment (contrary to the absolute protection of the environment under Articles 35(3) and 55) and since both rules emerged later in time, to the extent the rules are applicable any use of nuclear weapons must i rst be assessed against these customary rules. Only if no breach of these rules can be established, must the legality of that particular use be assessed -if applicable -against Articles 35(3) and 55.
Rule 43C, which prohibits excessive collateral damage to the environment, requires a balancing of values, namely expected environmental damage and the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. h e question of the extent to which the use of a nuclear weapon would be in conformity with this rule will therefore depend entirely on the circumstances of the case. Rule 44 prescribes that states must take all feasible precautions to avoid and in any event to minimise incidental damage to the environment. It is arguable that Rule 44 requires states to assess in advance the potential environmental harm of a particular method or means of warfare, including use of a nuclear weapon, and to assess to what extent the target can be neutralised by an alternative weapon system. Whether any use of a nuclear weapon is in conformity with this rule will therefore depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular ef orts by the nuclear weapon state prior to its decision to employ nuclear weapons and the reasonableness of its decision. h is chapter shows that the rules of the law of armed conl ict that protect the environment during armed conl ict may provide additional parameters and signii cant impediments for a nuclear weapon state to employ nuclear weapons. h ese parameters have materialised over the last twenty to thirty years and rel ect growing concern for environmental protection. Such protection is not only in the interest of all states, but also in the interest of mankind. 79 At er all, 'the environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life and the very health of human beings, including generations unborn. ' 80 79 Gab č í kovo-Nagymaros case, para. 53: 'h e Court recalls that it has recently had occasion to stress … the great signii cance that it attaches to respect for the environment, not only for States but also for the whole of mankind. ' 80 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, para. 29.
